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How people attribute blame in incidents of intimate partner violence (IPV) is an important 
research question, with legal Defences involving the use of provocation being successful in 
reducing the severity of sentences in Australian courts. We conducted a mock jury study that 
examines how manipulating the gender and culture of perpetrators and victims effects the 
application of the Provocation Defence (PD). Previous research has indicated that tenants of 
identity, such as gender and race, might be relevant to how people are judged. However, research 
into the relationship between gender of actors and the PD was inconclusive. The aims of this 
project are; 1)  Investigate how the culture and gender of perpetrators and victims of domestic’s 
violence affect the acceptance/ rejection of the PD, and 2) Investigate how the application of the 
PD interacts with attitudes toward gender and culture.  The strength and direction of 
relationships between PD measures and gender and culture manipulations are analyzed using 
Kruskal-Wallis test. Measures of attitude, which might be considered covariates, are also 
examined for relationship direction and strength.  Additionally, measures of attitude towards 
culture, the Multiculturalism Color-Blind Scale (MCBS) and Race-Related Attitudes and 
Multiculturalism Scale (RRAMS), are compared.  The results were non-significant across the 
board with the exception of measures of construct validity on the MCBS and RRAMS.  However 
there was a pattern to the responses on the PD measure which reflects some of the trends 
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The decisions made by juries have significant effects on people’s lives; however, jury 
deliberations are secret, so they cannot be asked about why they have reached a particular 
decision (Bell, 2018). This means it is important to conduct research to understand the factors 
that affect the judgements people make under the circumstances of a jury trial. Mock jury studies 
are also a very interesting lens through which to study how different attitudes affect how we 
perceive behaviour and make decisions. There is much concern within both legal and 
psychological literature that juror decisions are influenced by extra-legal factors, that is factors 
such as attributes of the defendant, victim and witnesses or  media coverage, which are not 
relevant to the legal matters at hand (McKimmie, Masters, Masser, Schuller, & Terry, 2013) 
(Poli, 2004). Of these extra-legal factors, the gender and ethnicity of the parties involved are 
identity categories that we as a society are particularly uncomfortable with jurors using to make 
judgements because of prejudice associated with racism and sexism (McKimmie, Antrobus, & 
Baguley, 2014).  The legal system relies on the triers of fact being rational and objective in their 
decisions and perceptions (McKimmie, Antrobus, & Baguley, 2014), however psychology has a 
rich literature on the various ways in which people’s perceptions of events is effected by their 
attitudes.  Wittenbrink, Gist, & Hilton, (1997) studied the effect of racial stereotypic knowledge 
in the construal of causality in a mock trial. They found that the influence of this effect impacts 
the encoding of trial evidence rather than biasing responses at the output stage. Poli (2004) found 
that the race of the victim impacted juror perceptions of victim responsibility and sentencing 
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recommendations in a simulated attempted rape trial.  McKimmie, Masters, Masser, Schuller, & 
Terry (2013) found that mock jurors spent more time looking at female defendants compared to 
male defendants, were less able to recall facts about the case, and paid less attention to the 
strength of the evidence against female defendants. They suggest that this difference is due to 
stereotype incongruence; female defendants do not fit cultural expectations of criminal 
behaviour, which influenced what people paid attention to when observing the case. A meta-
analysis by Mitchell, Haw, Pfeifer, and Meissner (2005) found a small but significant effect of 
racial bias in jury decision making while Devine & Caughlin (2014) found an effect of defendant 
gender in the metanalysis of individual characteristics and guilt judgements.  Findings like this 
have dire implications for the assumptions of rationality in decision making upon which the 
justice system relies (McKimmie, Antrobus, & Baguley, 2014), as it demonstrates the way in 
which internal biases can influence decision-making.  
 
The Provocation Defence (PD)  
The PD is a defence to murder. It reduces a charge from murder to manslaughter. 
Essentially, the defendant argues that the victim’s behaviour produced such an emotional 
response; they lost control and cannot be held responsible for killing this person (Korbelis, 
2016).   
The PD existence implies that in certain situations, violent behaviour is excused by 
emotional state. It suggests that the behaviour of the victim was so deplorable that the violence 
committed against them was justified. The PD has a certain victim-blaming logic inherent within 
it, making it quite interesting to study and quite controversial mostly due to its association with 
homophobic attacks (DE PASQUALE, 2002). This has led to its abolishment or amendment in a 
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number of jurisdictions around the world; however, it still exists in Australia. It has been used 
successfully relatively recently in the context of intimate partner violence (IPV). In R v Ramage 
(2004), it was successfully used to reduce the charge of a man who had killed his wife from 
murder to manslaughter. In R v Laracy (2008), it was cited as a reason for the crown accepting a 
guilty plea to the manslaughter of a woman who had initially been charged with the murder of 
her boyfriend.   
The PD has four interconnected elements which juries are asked to think about when 
making their decision in a trial. First, was there provocative conduct. Then how serious was that 
provocative conduct, they are explicitly asked to consider factors such as gender and race of the 
actors when considering the circumstances which feed into this severity. They are also asked if 
the accused lost self-control. And then, finally, to consider whether the provocation, in these 
circumstances, could cause a reasonable person to lose self-control. The PD asks jurors to put 
themselves into the shoes of the defendant in the first three elements of the defence. This is a 
subject test because it emphasises the subjective experience of the defendant (DE PASQUALE, 
2002). The juror cannot know what the defendant was actually thinking and so must rely on their 
own experiences and expectations of how people would behave. The cue to think about the 
gender and culture of the defendant and victim might also activate stereotypes that might 
influence how the behaviour of members of certain groups is perceived (Wittenbrink, Gist, & 
Hilton, 1997). Even the ‘objective’ test of asking if a reasonable person would respond in this 
way relies on socially constructed perceptions of normal/reasonable behaviour, which as De 
Pasquale (2002) points out are culturally bound and this boundedness can be utilised to produce 
narratives which support or undermine the behaviour of actors in a case.   
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The PD defence allows us to examine both how we perceive behaviour and how we 
attribute blame.  The elements of the PD measures perception of behaviour while 
acceptance/rejection measures blame attribution. Acceptance of the PD suggests that the victim’s 
behaviour provoked the defendant to such an extent that they were no longer responsible for their 
actions, while rejection of the defence implies that the defendant is solely responsible for their 
actions.  Blame attributions are important in the justice system as it is the institution that makes 
decisions about responsibility in our society, and thus it is important to understand what factors 
affect how people make blame attributions. Witte, Schroeder and Lohr (2006) studied blame 
attribution in incidences of IPV and found that participants assigned more responsibility for the 
victim when they were verbally aggressive before the assault, and that violence severity only 
influenced blame attributions for the perpetrator when another mitigating factor was also present, 
such as victim aggression or nonviolent perpetrator expectancies.  Korbelis (2016) supports this 
link between cultural expectations of behaviour and blame attributions in her finding that 
acceptance of traditional social roles was related to acceptance of the PD in IPV scenarios. 
 
 
 Gender, IPV and the PD.  
Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) is an important social problem in Australia. A 2014 
report on the National Homicide Monitoring Program found that approximately one woman a 
week was killed by her intimate partner (Bryant & Bricknell, 2017). Although this rate has 
reduced over time, the intimate partner homicide rate remains the most prevalent type of 
homicide in Australia at 0.33 per 100,000 for women and 0.14 per 100,000 for men in the 2017-
18 period (Bricknell, 2020). These statistics are possibly an under-estimate of the problem as it is 
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widely held that incidence of IPV goes unreported (Voce & Boxall, 2018. ). There is a body of 
research which suggests that IPV as a widespread and pervasive problem which has 
disproportionally effected women, is embedded in cultural norms which justify, excuse and 
minimize violence (MacDowell, 2013).   
There is some evidence of a gender difference in the expectations of emotional behaviour 
wherein males are allowed to lose control of emotions such as anger more than women (Hess, 
Thibault, Adams Jr, & Kleck, 2010). Wasarhaley, Lynch, & Golding (2015) also found that mock 
jurors’ decisions about the credibility, sympathy and verdict on an incident of IPV between 
lesbian couples could be affected by gender stereotypes when manipulating the masculine or 
feminine presentation of the victim and defendant. The danger of the PD in matters of IPV is in 
the underlying logic which invites the weight of the court to sit behind the defendant and 
condemn the victim (Heard, 2007),  when such victim-blaming logic has been found to be 
detrimental to the criminal justices systems attempts to deal with IPV (Signal & Taylor, 2008). 
Meyer (2011) examined the experiences of 29 women who had sort help from South Queensland 
police after an incident of IPV and found that the often encountered victim-blaming attitudes a 
stereotyping despite an existing policy environment that promotes victim protection and offender 
accountability. This highlights the need to closely examine how the PD is used and the gendered 
and cultural norms it supports (DE PASQUALE, 2002).  
The PD asks jurors to think about the victim and the defendant's behaviour when 
determining who takes responsibility for an incident. The first two elements: was there 
provocative conduct and how serious was it, focus on the behaviour of the victim while the third, 
did the defendant lose self-control, highlights the behaviour of the perpetrator.  In this way, both 
beliefs about the perpetrator and the victim play a role in determining how people are judged, 
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which MacDowell (2013) points out is something that is missing in the literature around IPV and 
the criminal justice system. In this regard, it is important to measure both positive and negative 
beliefs about men and women because it is the intersection of these attitudes that underly the 
perceptions and judgements made by individuals observing an IPV incident.  
There is some evidence that attitudes toward gender are associated with different blame 
attribution in IPV. Pavlou & Knowles (2001) found that provocation by a female victim leads to 
greater attributions of responsibility in an incident of violence than her male spouse. They also 
found that this was associated with participant's attitudes towards women, with more 
conservative attitudes associated with less sympathy with the female victim. Similerly, Korbelis 
(2016) found that traditional attitudes towards social roles were associated with PD acceptance. 
However, she did not find support for her hypothesis that perpetrator gender and observer gender 
would have an interaction effect on PD acceptance.  Apart from Korbelis (2016), this a lack of 
research that examines how social attitudes are associated with blame attribution and perception 
of behaviour. So the current study will extend Korbelis (2016) both to more carefully examine 
the way beliefs about men and women in their roles as victim and perpetrator as well as examing 
another identity category highly pertinent to the PD debate, ethnicity. (DE PASQUALE, 2002).  
 
Ethnicity, Culture, and the PD  
The 2016 census reported that the top ten commonly reported ancestries were Australian 
(34%), some variation of European (English 36%, Irish 11%, Scottish  9%, etc.), Chinese (5.6%), 
and Indian (4.6%) (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017). This reflects that although Australia 
has a Caucasian European ancestry majority, there is a growing community of people who 
identify most closely with an Asian cultural group. This is also seen in the country of birth 
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statistics. While 66% of Australians report of their country of birth as Australia followed by 
England and New Zealand, the proportion of those born overseas who were born in China and 
India has increased since 2011 (from 6.0% to 8.3%, and 5.6% to 7.4% respectively) (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2017). This ethnic and cultural diversity makes it more critical than ever to 
understand how minority groups are treated in Australian institutions and, apart from Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait islander peoples, this is an area of the literature that is underdeveloped. 
Mitchell, Haw, Pfeifer, & Meissner (2005) found racial bias against minority groups in their 
meta-analysis of defendant treatment in mock jury research; however, the minority groups were 
overwhelmingly black in the studies upon which they based their analysis. Poli (2004) examined 
quantitative and qualitative assessments by mock jurors in an assault case involving white, 
aboriginal Asian, or middle eastern victims and found different patterns of results for different 
ethnicities. Asian victims were seen as more responsible while aboriginal defendants were given 
lesser sentences, and the assault was seen as most serious with middle eastern actors. These 
findings support the idea that different subcultural groups of Australians might be perceived as 
having different expectations of behaviour, which exaggerates the gender difference in 
acceptable behaviour (DE PASQUALE, 2002). 
One group for whom different societal expectations around IPV has been a topic of 
academic interest are so-called Honour cultures. Honour culture generally refers societie where a  
family or individual's social image being reliant on compliance with rigid gender hierarchies. A 
man's reputation is maintained through aggressive policing of their female relatives and spouses 
while women's loyalty and subservience is valued (Khan, 2016). It often promotes and excuses 
aggressive hypermasculinity and female dehumanisation. (Lowe, Khan, Thanzami, Barzy, & 
Karmaliani, 2018). Although honour-based violence has occurred ubiquitously historically, it is 
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now more commonly associated with Middle Eastern or South Asian families living in 
patriarchal collectivist cultures in countries of origin and diasporic communities worldwide 
(Khan, 2016).  Lowe, Khan, Thanzami, Barzy, & Karmaliani (2018) examined adherence to 
honour-based attitudes in Malaysian, Indian Iranian, and Pakistani participants when reading a 
vignette about a husband who, despite his own marital infidelity, verbally abuses and physically 
assaults his wife after discovering that she has been unfaithful. They found that both males and 
females endorsed the view that the wife had injured the husband's honour through her behaviour. 
The concept of different cultural norms around gender roles has seeped into stereotypes about 
South East Asians, and discourses have opened up about honour-based violence in western 
institutions, including the criminal justice system (Mayeda & Vijaykumar, 2016).   De Pasquale 
(2002) articulates the idea that culture can be mobilised in the context of the PD to excuse the 
violence of men from minorty backgrounds towards women. However the white heteronormative 
mainstream cultural norms are embedded within the element of the PD which asks how a 
reasonable person would behave. This implies that a persons attitude towards cultural diversity 
might influence their decisions about defendants of different ethnicities and thus implied 
different cultural backgrounds.  
The concept of colour blindness can be expressed through the idea that race does not and 
should not matter; it is associated with measures of modern racism and negative attitudes toward 
diversity initiatives such as affirmative action (Awad & Jackson, 2011) (Ryan, Hunt, Weible, 
Peterson, & Casas, 2007).  It is possible that this assimilationist attitude is associated with more 
strongly held beliefs about the reasonableness of behaviour being associated with patriarchal 
white cultural norms; however, there is a gap in the literature in this regard. At the opposite end 
of the scale in terms of attitudes towards culture is multiculturalism. This might be understood as 
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an acceptance of differences and acknowledgement of the role diversity plays in shaping our 
society (Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson, & Casas, 2007).  The variation among individuals 
between these two poles might provide some insight into how people perceive behaviour and 
make blame attributions in the complex intersection of gender and culture accessed by the PD in 
situation of IPV.  
Aims and Hypotheses  
The primary aim is to investigate how the culture and gender of perpetrators and victims 
of domestic’s violence affect the perceptions of behaviour and blame attributions made by mock 
jurors when asked to examine an incident of IPV through the lens of the PD. This extends 
previous work by Korbelis (2016) on the effect of gender of actors on PD application and tests 
assumptions made in De Pasquale’s (2002) argument about the PD's utility as a culture defence.  
As such, the first three hypotheses are as follows: 
1. There will be a significant effect of gender of actors on PD measure 
2. · There will be a significant effect of the culture of actors on PD measure 
3. · There will be an interaction effect between gender and culture of actors and PD 
measures.  
The direction of effect have not been specified as this is a relatively novel area of study 
and the complexity of the relationship between gender and ethnicity evident in the literature 
make it difficult to draw clear predictions about strength and direction.   
The secondary aim is to investigate the relationship between attitudes toward gender and 
the PD and attitudes toward culture because this might reveal some of the mechanisms behind 
the effect if there is one to be found. It will also extend the literature on how juror decision 
making in cases of IPV is related to social attitudes of observers, as this may be the first to 
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measure attitude towards gender and attitudes towards culture simultaneously.  The next two 
exploratory hypothesise are: 
4. There will be a significant relationship between PD application and measures of 
culture attitudes  
5. · There will be a significant relationship between PD application and measures of 
gender attitudes 
Finally, this study is one of the first to utilise a new measure of attitude toward culture,  
The Race Related Attitudes and Multiculturalism Scale (RRAMS),  since its publication in May 
of this year (Haag, et al., 2020). In order to extend the work done by its authors, this study will 
compare participants' performance on this scale with a more established scale, which purports to 
measure a similar concept, the Multicultural Colour-Blindness Scale (MCBS). As such, the final 
hypothesis is: 
6.  RRAMS an MCBS will have a strong positive relationship.  
Method 1266/2250 
Ethics approval for the study was granted by the sub-committee of the School of 
Psychology Human Ethics Committee (approval number 20/47).  
Design and Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to view one of four versions of vignettes describing 
an occurrence of IPV based on the case summary of R v Ramage. As seen in Table 1, the gender 
and race of the perpetrator and victim were manipulated through the pronouns and names of the 
defendant and victim in a 2 by 2 between-subjects design.  
Table 1 Levels of experimental design  
 Cultural Background  
Gender Male White Male Asian 




The participants were asked multiple-choice questions to ensure they had attended to the 
relevant stimuli of names, gender, and cultural background of both the victim and defendant. The 
participants were then given a flowchart describing the PD (see Appendix 1) and asked a series 
of multiple-choice questions to examine their comprehension. Next, they completed the PD 
questionnaire. Finally, participants completed the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI), 
Ambivalence Towards Men Inventory (AMI), Multiculturalism Colour-Blind Scale (MCBS), and 
Race-Related Attitudes and Multiculturalism Scale (RRAMS) measures. They were thanked for 
their participation and given the opportunity to nominate their contact details if they were 
interested in obtaining feedback about the study. 
 
Participants 
The participants were adult Australian citizens who were eligible for jury duty, according 
to the South Australian Juries Act (1927). That is, they were not legal professionals, police 
officers, or governors. Participants were recruited from the community through social media, 
word of mouth, and an Adelaide University first year psychology student participant pool. A-
priori power analysis indicated that 280 participants were needed to achieve 80% power; 
however, 203 were recruited. Participants were asked demographic questions, including their 
age, gender, background, and legal training. Participants who reported legal training or did not 
complete all questions were excluded from the analysis. There were 152 participants with a mean 
age of 26, ranging from18 to 74. The sample was 30% male and 69% female and 1 participant 






Participants were to read a trial transcript (edited for length) based on the judge's 
summary of R v Ramage ( 2004), a real case of intimate partner violence in which the PD was 
attempted, heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales in 2015. While the identities and 
some of the details had been removed or changed, the case summary attempted to retain as much 
information as possible to reflect the amount of circumstantial information a real jury might 
receive in the course of a trial.  A copy of the transcript can be viewed in Appendix 2. This 
study's manipulation involved four versions of the case summary, see Table 1, which differed by 
gender and implied cultural background. This was achieved by changing the names and gender 
pronouns present in each text.  
Dependent Measures 
Participants were introduced to the PD through a questionnaire based on different 
elements of the Defence, along with some explanation similar to jury instructions. Additionally, 
participants accessed a flow chart which demonstrates the relationship between the elements and 
the Defence decision.  This questionnaire along with copies of the other dependent measures in 
this experiment can be accessed through appendix one. The first element of the PD is: was there 
provocative conduct. It asks participants to report on a Likert scale the extent to which they 
believe the victim behaved in a way that is likely to provoke a strong reaction in an ordinary 
person. The second element: how serious was the provocative conduct, yields a measure of how 
strong a reaction they would expect and explicitly asks them to take into account factors such as 
culture and gender. The third element: did the accused lose self-control, measures the perception 
of the accused capacity for self-control in the context of the scenario. While the fourth element, 
19 
 
could the provocative conduct cause a reasonable person to lose self-control, asks participants to 
consider whether their chosen level of provocation would reduce the responsibility an ordinary 
person has for their actions. The final question, would you accept the PD, offers only a yes or no 
in order to reflect real-life jury decisions and provide an insight into how participants thinking on 
the different elements feeds into their final decision.  This questionnaire was developed in 
previous research by Korbelis (2016) but has not been validated. In this study, six multiple-
choice questions have been added to assess participants' comprehension of PD.  
Ambivalent Sexism Inventory.  
The variable of attitudes toward gender was measured as a covariant through the Ambivalent 
sexism Inventory (ASI) (Glick & Fiske 1996)and Ambivalence toward men Inventory(AMI) 
(Glick & Fiske 1999).  The ASI measures both benevolent and hostile forms of sexism, which 
are thought to be related to social role performance and expectations. Cronbach's alpha varied 
between .73 and .92, and it was found to have convergent validity through strong correlations 
with other measures of sexism. Interestingly hostility subscale scores were correlated with scores 
on a modern racism measure  (Gamst, Liang et al. 2011). While there does not appear to be 
specific validation of the ASI for the Australian population, it has been used in the Australian 
context (Glick, Fiske et al., 2000). 
Ambivalence Towards Men Inventory 
AMI is the sister scale to the ASI, which measures benevolent and hostile attitudes toward men, 
which may contribute to toxic masculinity (Glick & Fiske 1999). It is important to include a 
measure of attitudes towards men as it not only the attitudes toward female victims and 
perpetrators, which might inform their decision making in the provocation space, and this is an 
area that has been neglected in the literature (MacDowell, 2013). The AMI is correlated with the 
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ASI, Cronbach's alpha varied between .83 and .87, and convergent validity was established 
through correlation with other measures of attitudes toward men (Gamst, Liang, et al. 2011). 
Like the ASI, the study has not been validated explicitly for the Australian context, but cross-




Multiculturalism Color-Blind Scale and Race-Related Attitudes and Multiculturalism 
Scale.  
The variable of attitudes toward culture was also measured as a covariant through the 
Multiculturalism Color-Blind Scale (MCBS) and the Race-Related Attitudes and 
Multiculturalism Scale (RRAMS).  The MCBS is an 8 item scale that asks participants to rate on 
a seven-point scale the extent to which they believe adopting each of the items would improve 
intergroup relations in the U.S (Ryan, Hunt et al., 2007). Its two subscales, multiculturalism 
(Cronbach's alpha 0.78) and colour-blind (Cronbach's alpha 0.69),  assess the extent to which 
participants endorse colour-blind ideology (i.e., the idea that race does not and should not matter) 
or Multicultural ideology ( the concept that multiple cultural identities should coexist) in race 
relations (Awad & Jackson 2011).  While this scale was developed and validated in America, it 
was easily adapted for an Australian context, see Appendix 1.  
The RRAMS is an 8-item scale that measures Anglo-centric/ Assimilationist attitudes and 
Inclusive/Pluralistic attitudes (Haag, Santiago et al., 2020). It was developed and validated in 
Australia, and the authors chose to report McDonald’s omega (0.83 and 0.77 respectively) and 
ordinal alpha (0.85 and 0.79) in place of Cronbach's alpha. While the RRAMS has the advantage 
of validation in Australia, it has not been independently validated due to its recent development. 
As such, this study also contains another measure of the same concept so that convergent validity 








 All statistical analysis was completed using JASP, an open-source statistical program 
supported by the University of Amsterdam. 
Descriptive statistics PD measure by the gender of the defendant 
Of the 152 participants, 82 participants read a case summary where the defendant was 
female, while 70 read one where the defendant was male. As shown in Table 2, the mean score 
for female defendants in the first element of the PD Defence, provocative conduct, was 2.17 
(SD=0.87); for males, the mean was 2.27 (SD=0.93). The seriousness of provocative conduct had 
a female mean of 2.32 (SD= 0.93) and a male mean of 2.36 (SD= 0.9). The perception that the 
defendant lost control had a mean of 1.85 (SD=0.8) for females, while males had 1.96 (SD= 
0.84). Whether or not a reasonable person might have acted in the same way as the defendant has 
female defendants given an average score of 3.07 (SD= 1.03) while males received 3.36 (SD= 
1.02). Finally, 38% of participants accepted the PD when there was a female defendant, while 
62% rejected it. For a male defendant, 26% accepted, while 74% rejected the PD, as shown in 
table 3. Table 2 also shows a strong positive skew in both cases for the Provocative conduct and 
loss of control variables. This means that the responses are grouped towards the beginning of the 
spectrum, translating into strongly agree/disagree responses. The provocative conduct variable is 
also leptokurtic, especially for the female defendant category.  The significance of the Shapiro 
Wilks statistic (p= <0.001) in all cases suggests that the data is not normally distributed.  As 
normality is a key assumption of many statistical tests, non-parametric versions of these tests 
will need to be reported.  
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for PD measure by Defendant Gender 
 provocative conduct  seriousness  lose control  reasonablness  
   Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  
Valid   82   70   82   70   82   70   82   70    
Missing   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0    
Mean   2.171   2.271   2.317   2.357   1.854   1.957   3.073   3.357    
Std. Deviation   0.872   0.797   0.928   0.901   0.803   0.842   1.028   1.022    
Skewness   0.916   1.234   0.080   0.076   0.713   0.683   0.060   -0.439    
Std. Error of Skewness   0.266   0.287   0.266   0.287   0.266   0.287   0.266   0.287    
Kurtosis   0.938   1.867   -0.879   -0.750   0.092   0.052   -0.854   -0.736    
Std. Error of Kurtosis   0.526   0.566   0.526   0.566   0.526   0.566   0.526   0.566    
Shapiro-Wilk   0.817   0.744   0.874   0.877   0.818   0.831   0.896   0.859    
P-value of Shapiro-Wilk   < .001   < .001   < .001   < .001   < .001   < .001   < .001   < .001    
Minimum   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000    
Maximum   5.000   5.000   4.000   4.000   4.000   4.000   5.000   5.000    
 
 
Table 3 Frequency of PD acceptance and rejection by Defendant Gender 
Case gender  apply PD  Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent  Cumulative Percent  
Female   Accept   31   37.805   37.805   37.805   
    Reject   51   62.195   62.195   100.000   
  Missing   0   0.000           
    Total   82   100.000           
Male   Accept   18   25.714   25.714   25.714   
    Reject   52   74.286   74.286   100.000   
  Missing   0   0.000           












Descriptive Statistics for PD measure by Case Culture 
79 participants read a case summary where the actors were implied to be from a   
honour culture through the ethnicity of the defendant and victim and 73, where they were 
implied to be from a non-honor culture.  As seen in Table 4, the average score for the perception 
of provocative conduct where the defendant was Indian was 2.25 (SD=0.95) whereas the mean= 
2.190 (SD= 0.717) when they were white. Seriousness had a mean of 2.19 (SD=0.94) for honour 
culture and 2.43 (SD=0.89). Loss of control had a mean for honor culture of 1.88 (SD=0.82) and 
non-honour of 1.92 (SD= 0.83). Reasonableness had an average of  3.11 (SD= 1.03) for white 
defendants and 3.29(SD=1.03). 27% of participants accepted the PD, while 72% rejected it when 
the defendant was from an honour culture, while 36% of participants accepted the PD, and 63% 
rejected it when the defendant was not. By taking the measure of skew and dividing it by its 
standard error, it is possible to gauge the relative importance of the skew statistic, using the 
figures in table 4, both honour (3.064) and non-honour (4.413) cultures have a notable positive 
skew in perception of provocative conduct, while only honour (3.078) culture appears to in the 
lose control variable. Using a similar method, the distribution of non-honour culture scores in 
provocative conduct appears to be highly leptokurtic (5.568).  The Shapiro-Wilk statistic was 
significant at <0.001 in all cases, and thus, normal distribution cannot be assumed.  
Table 4 Descriptive statistics of PD measure by Defendant Ethnicity 
 Provocative 
conduct  
seriousness  lose control  reasonablness  












Valid   73   79   73   79   73   79   73   79    





seriousness  lose control  reasonablness  












Mean   2.247   2.190   2.233   2.430   1.877   1.924   3.110   3.291    
Std. Deviation   0.954   0.717   0.936   0.887   0.816   0.829   1.035   1.027    
 Skewness   0.861   1.196   0.349   -0.180   0.865   0.560   0.007   -0.326    
Std. Error of 
Skewness  
 0.281   0.271   0.281   0.271   0.281   0.271   0.281   0.271    
Kurtosis   0.260   2.979   -0.695   -0.759   0.584   -0.313   -1.074   -0.659    
Std. Error of 
Kurtosis  
 0.555   0.535   0.555   0.535   0.555   0.535   0.555   0.535    
Shapiro-Wilk   0.814   0.750   0.869   0.863   0.804   0.835   0.874   0.889    
P-value of 
Shapiro-Wilk  
 < .001   < .001   < .001   < .001   < .001   < .001   < .001   < .001    
Minimum   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000    
Maximum   5.000   5.000   4.000   4.000   4.000   4.000   5.000   5.000    
 
Table 5 Frequency of PD application by defendant ethnicity 
case culture  apply PD  Frequency  Percent  Valid Percent  Cumulative Percent  
honour   Accept   20   27.397   27.397   27.397   
    Reject   53   72.603   72.603   100.000   
  Missing   0   0.000           
    Total   73   100.000           
non-honour   Accept   29   36.709   36.709   36.709   
    Reject   50   63.291   63.291   100.000   
  Missing   0   0.000           
    Total   79   100.000           
 
Manipulation Checks  
Comprehension of the PD measure was assessed through 6 multiple-choice questions. 
74% answered question one correctly, 63% answered question two correctly, 45% answered 
question three correctly, 78% for question four, 82% for question five, and 52% for question six. 
Attention to relevant details of the case summary, including defendant and victim name, 
defendant and victim gender, and defendant and victim ethnicity, were also assessed. The 
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percentage of participants whose response matched the condition they were assigned to for 
defendant name was 97% for white male defendant and white female defendant and 100% for 
both male and female Asian defendants. The pattern was identical for victim name.  Defendant 
gender matched the condition 100% except for white female defendant with 95%. Victim gender 
had the same pattern. Defendant's background had 91% correct for white male defendants, 88% 
for white female defendants, 85% for Asian male defendants, 97% for Asian female defendants. 
94% correctly identified white male victim background, 84% white female, 85% Asian male, and 
92% Asian female.   
There will be a significant effect of gender of actors on PD measure 
This hypothesis, along with hypothesis 2 and 3, require multiple comparisons to be made 
and as such the Bonferroni correction has been utilised to reduce the possibility of a type one 
error (Navarro, Foxcroft, & Faulkenberry, 2019). While the original alpha level was p=0.05 in 
line with convention, each of the four elements of the PD plus its application requires their own 
test, and thus, the new alpha level is p=0.01. As the data is not normally distributed, the Kruskal-
Wallis test is used as a non-parametric alternative to ANOVA.  The Kruskal-Wallis test 
determines if there is a statistically significant difference between the medians of independent 
groups. For provocative conduct, H(1)=0.8; however, it was not significant (p=0.37). This is 
displayed in table 6. For Seriousness of provocative conduct, the Kruskal-Wallis Test also 
returned a non-significant result (H(1)=0.06, p=0.801).  The loss of control variable has 
H(1)=0.55 p=0.46, which is not significant, and reasonableness is similarly non-significant 
(H(1)=3.229, p=0.072). As PD application is a nominal variable, a chi-square test was used to 
determine if there was a significant difference in  application based on gender. It found X2(1, 




Table 6 Kruskal-Wallis Test for gender of defendant by PD elements  
 Statistic df p 
Provocative 
Conduct 
0.803 1 0.370 
Seriousness 0.064 1 0.801 
Lose control 0.548 1 0.459 
Reasonablenss 3.229 1 0.072 
 
There will be a significant effect of the culture of actors on PD measure 
The Kruskal-Wallis Test returned a non-significant (H(1)=0.02, p=0.90) result for the 
effect of culture of actors on provocative conduct. Significance is set at p0.01 after Bonferroni 
correction. For seriousness, H(1)=2.29, however, p=0.13, and thus, there is no significant effect. 
Perception of loss of control did not report a significant effect (H(1)=0.171, p=0.679) and neither 
did reasonableness (H(1)=1.26, p=0.261). Chi-squared test of PD application by culture of 
defendant found X2(1, N=152)=1.51, p=0.22, which is not significant.  









 Statistic df  p 
Provocative conduct 0.016 1 0.901 
Seriousness  2.290 1  0.130 
Lose control 0.171 1   0.679 




There will be an interaction effect between gender and culture of actors and PD measure 
As indicated by the Shapiro-Wilks test, the data is unlikely to be normally distributed and 
thus a two-way ANOVA which would allow assessment of interaction effects in not possible. 
Although the significance of the relationships cannot be tested, descriptive plots have been 
generated to illustrate the directions of the relationships between the PD measure and the gender 
of actors and the culture of actors.  
 Provocative conduct, shown in figure 1, shows a slight crossover interaction between the 
gender and culture of actors. Female defendants from non-honour cultures appear to receive the 
lowest scores, which translates to stronger endorsement of provocative conduct on the part of the 
white male victim. While male defendants from a non-honour culture receive the highest scores 
indicating lower perceptions of provocative conduct on the part of white female victims. The 
relationship between male and female defendants from honour cultures seems comparatively flat.  
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Figure 1Provocative conduct by Defendant Gender and Culture 
 
Seriousness of provocative conduct, as seen in figure 2, seems to have a negative 
relationship between female and male defendants in non-honour culture. Female defendants 
receiving the highest scores indicating participants perceived the provocative conduct as least 
serious for this group. Female defendants from honour culture received the lowest score, 
suggesting that the provocative conduct was perceived as most serious for this group.  
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Figure 2 Seriousness of provocative conduct by defendant gender and culture 
 
  
Male defendants from honour cultures were perceived to have lost control the least while 
female defendants were perceived to have lost control the most. For non-honour culture, the 
females had a higher average rating than male defendants indicating that they were perceived to 
have lost control less.  
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Figure 4 displays the relationship between the defendant gender and culture in ratings of 
reasonableness of actions. Male defendants from non-honour cultures have the highest average 
score indicating that their actions were viewed as the least reasonable. Female defendants from 
both honour and non-honour cultures received the lowest ratings on average, suggesting that 
their behaviour was seen as most reasonable.  
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 There will be a significant relationship between PD measure and measures of culture 
attitudes  
the Mann-Whitney test is used to determine the relationship between the application of 
the PD defence and the subscales of the MBCS and RRAMS.  As this hypothesis requires 
multiple comparisons , four because each measure of culture has two subscales, the alpha level 
for significance is p=0.0125 after Bonferroni correction. Assimilationist attitudes, a subscale of 
the RRAMS, had a U(150)=2205.5 p=0.209 and effect size of -0.126 which is given by rank 
biserial correlation. Pluralistic attitudes, the companion subscale of the RRAMS, had a 
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U(150)=2561.5 p=0.881 and effect size 0.015. Neither of which are significant. The MCBS 
subscale of Colour-blindness had U(150)=2964.00 p=0.081 and biserial correlation of 0.175. 
Multicultural attitudes was similarly non-significant (U(150)=2869.5, p=0.168, effect size= 
0.137). 
 
There will be a significant relationship between PD application and measures of gender 
attitudes 
Although a Shiparo-Wilks test suggests that the ASI (accept W=0.976 p=0.379, reject 
W=0.980 p= 0.124) and AMI( accept W= 0.960 p=0.092, reject W=0.992 p=0.787))  may be 
normally distributed, the Mann-Whitney U will be reported for consistency sake. The dependent 
variables are participants scores on the ASI and AMI and the grouping variable is PD application. 
The ASI received a rank of U(150)=2085.00, p=0.84 effect size -0.174. The AMI U(150)= 
2025.00 p=0.050, effect size -0.98. After a Bonferroni correction the alpha level has reduced to 
p=0.025 
 
RRAMS and MCBS will be strongly positively correlated 
The construct validity of the RRAMS and MCBS was tested through Pearson’s 
 correlation of scores on the subscales of each measure, which purport to measure the same thing. 
The MCBS colour-blindness subscale and RRAMS assimilationist subscale shows a weak 
negative correlation (r = -0.23, p=0.002), as seen in table 10. The RRAMS pluralistic subscale 





Table 8 Pearson correlations of MCBS and RRAMS subscales 
         Pearson's r  p  Lower 95% CI  Upper 95% CI  
Assimilationist   -   Pluralistic   -0.542  ***  < .001   -0.645   -0.419   
Assimilationist   -   Colour Blind   -0.253  **  0.002   -0.396   -0.098   
Assimilationist   -   Multicultural   -0.230  **  0.004   -0.376   -0.074   
Pluralistic   -   Colour Blind   0.260  **  0.001   0.105   0.403   
Pluralistic   -   Multicultural   0.444  ***  < .001   0.306   0.563   
Colour Blind   -   Multicultural   0.345  ***  < .001   0.196   0.478   
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  
 
Discussion  
There will be a significant effect of gender of actors on PD measure  
Kruskal-Wallis Tests for each element of the provocation defence measure and the Chi-
squared test of independence all returned p values above the 0.01 corrected alpha level. This 
means that the data do not support the first hypothesis of a significant effect of gender of actors 
on PD measure. This non-significant results has two possible explanations. The one possible 
explanation for the non significant result is that this study does not have sufficient power to 
distinguish between groups. The A Priori power analysis suggested that 280 participants would 
be needed to achieve 80% power for a two way ANOVA. This study only achieved n= 152 and 
the Kruskal-Wallis test is generally less powerful than its parametric counterpart.  
Secondly, it could be the case that there is truly no effect of defendant gender on how 
juries perceive behaviour or attribute blame in incidences of IPV as measured by the PD 
measure.  This would line up with findings by Korbelis (2016) who also did not find a significant 
effect of gender of actors on PD application. It would not however line up with other literature 
on juror perception and gender. Devine and Caughlin (2014) found a small but significant effect 
of defendant gender on guilty decisions in their meta-analysis of individual characteristics and 
guilt judgements in mock trial research. Similarly, the results of this study do not line up with 
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Wasarhaley, Lynch, & Golding (2015) finding that masculine and feminine presentation of 
female actors in an IPV incident effected juror perception of defendant and victim provocation. 
 While this study did not find an effect of defendant gender between groups, in examining 
the mean scores on the PD measure an interesting pattern emerged. The mean scores for 
provocative conduct, visible in table 2, were 2.17 and 2.27 for female and male defendants 
respectively. This translates to participant agreeing that there was provocative conduct.  For 
seriousness of provocative conduct mean scores were 2.317 female defendants and 2.357 for 
male defendants. This translate into participants most participants stating that the defendant 
would have felt ‘a lot’ provoked by the victim’s actions.  The mean scores for loss of control 
were 1.854 for female and 1.957 for male. This translates into most participants agreeing or 
strongly agreeing that the accused lost control. The mean scores for the extent to which 
participants believed that a reasonable person would behave the same way as the defendant were 
a little higher,  3.073 for women and 3.357 for men, indicating that most participants neither 
agreed nor disagreed.  However, despite this pattern on the elements of the PD which would 
seem to indicate that most participants would apply the PD, as can be seen in table 3, most 
participants rejected it.  This perhaps indicates that although jurors perception of behaviour 
aligns with findings like Witte, Schroeder, & Lohr (2006), who found that verbal aggression on 
the part of the victim increased particpants blame attribution, they were reluctant to formalise the 
attribution of blame to victim or absolve the defendant of  guilt.  
 
There will be a significant effect of the culture of actors on PD measure 507/400 
Kruskal-Wallis Tests and chi-squared test of independence indicate that the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected and therefore they hypothesis that culture of actors will have a 
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significant effect on PD measure is not supported.  This runs counter to the findings of (Mitchell, 
Haw, Pfeifer, & Meissner’s (2005) meta-analysis which found  victim and defendant ethnicity 
had significant effects on  jury decision making It also doesn’t alight with Wittenbrink, Gist, & 
Hilton (1997) finding that stereotype information about African Americans could affect jurors 
perception of an incident of violence. The results of this study do align with Poli (2004) who 
found patterns in how different racial minorities were perceived by participants in an incident of 
violence but did not find a main effect of cultural group.  
In addition to the two explanations for the non-significant of the H values explored in 
hypothesis one, it is possible that the manipulation which the investigators made to the 
independent variable failed. In order to control for this possibility manipulation checks of 
participants attenuation to the pertinent details of the case summary and comprehension of the 
PD were included in the survey.  The percentage of people who correctly identified which gender 
their defendant and victim belonged to varied between 95 and 100%. Comparatively, the 
percentage of participants who correctly identified the cultural background of the defendant and 
victim varied between 84% and 97%. While the scores for victim culture were slightly this 
evidence does not support the idea that the manipulation of defendant gender or cultural group 
failed. On the other hand participants scores on multiple choice questions testing comprehension 
of the PD varied from 45% to 82% indicating that the PD was not particularly well understood 
by participants. This has could have negatively impacted the PD measure responses and the 
results of the study. McKimmie, Antrobus, & Baguley (2014) however found that objective 
comprehension of jury insrtrction is not as important as sunjective comprehsion to understaning 
how jurors will behave.  
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Similarly to hypothesis one, there is an interesting pattern in the average scores which 
seems to reflect a perception of behaviour which generally follows previous findings about 
blame attribution in IPV despite a reluctance to attribute blame to the victim or absolve the 
defendant of responsibility. For both honor and non-honour groups the mean score was around 2 
for provocative conduct. This means participants generally agreed that there was provocative 
conduct. For seriousness, the average across groups was around 2, indicating that participants 
thought the provoking conduct was severe. The mean score for loss of control was also around 
two indicating that participants agreed that the defendant was not in control of his behaviour.  
Reasonableness again attracted a higher score, approximately 3, suggesting participants neither 
agreed nor disagreed with the normality of the defendant’s response to the provocation. The 
percentages of PD application frequency were however still heavily skewed towards rejection. 
This pattern in the responses to the PD does support De Pasquale's (2002) argument that PD 
defence does not truly grant special protection to minority groups instead reproduces dominant 
culture norms 
 
 There will be an interaction effect between gender and culture of actors and PD measure  
The data for each element of the PD measure is not normally distributed and I was unable 
to find a nonparametric alternative to two-way ANOVA, which tests for interaction effects. The 
third hypothesis, that there is an interaction effect between gender therefore cannot be tested.   
Although results are not significant and we cannot say that the differences displayed are 
real, it is still interesting to analyse the graphs of PD measure by culture and gender because it 
gives some indication of how these two independent variables are related to each other in this 
data set if nowhere else.   
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Provocative conduct, as displayed in figure 1, suggests that male defendants from white 
backgrounds received the highest scores and therefore lowest average ratings of provocative 
conduct. If this were a real effect it might mean that participants either perceived the physical 
and verbal aggression on the part of the white female victim as provocative least often or at least 
not provocative to a white male defendant, because as MacDowell (2013) points it is not only the 
beliefs about the victim which are important in how IPV is percieved but also there beliefs about 
the perpetrator. The positions are also reversed with female defendants from non-honour cultures 
receiving the lowest scores overall. The difference in mean scores between the male and female 
defendants from honour cultures was much smaller than the difference between non-honour 
culture male and female defendents This creates what could be a slight crossover interaction, 
where non-honour conditions are percieved as containing provocative conduct both most, for 
male defendants, and least, female defedants, often. While the differences in means for the 
gender and culture conditions on their own are not significat, it is someitmes possible that 
interaction effects are significant nontheles. However, this cannot be assesed as the data is not 
normally distributed and it would not be appropriate to treat it as though it were.  
Seriousness gives some measure of how severe the participants felt the provocative 
conduct was for each condition. Female defendants from honour culture received the lowest 
average score, suggesting that the provocative conduct was perceived as most serious for this 
group. In this case female defendants from non-honour cultures also had the highest mean 
suggesting provocation was rated as more severe lest often in this condition. Male defendants 
from honour cultures and non-honour cultures received very similar mean scores. Female 
defendants making up either extreme of this arrangement is interesting especially given 
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Wasarhaley, Lynch, & Golding’s (2015) finding an effect of gender sterotpyes on jury percepion 
when examing IPV in a lesbian couple. 
Loss of control measures the perception that the defendant is in control of their actions at 
the time of the attack on the victim. In the non-honour culture condition female defendants were 
perceived to be in control less often that their male counterparts, however as can be clearly seen 
in figure 3, there is another crossover between the conditions as male Indian defendants had the 
highest mean score while female defendants had the lowest. Male defendants receiving the 
highest mean score and therefore being perceived as out of control least often is interesting 
because it does not align with Wittenbrink, Gist, & Hilton, (1997) findings that stereotype 
knowledge effected juror perception. The stereotype of men from minority groups being 
perceived as less able to control themselves does not appear to map out in the data.   
Reasonableness measures the extent to which the participant believes that an ordinary 
person in the defendants’ circumstances would behave in the same way. Female defendants from 
both honour and non-honour conditions received similar mean scores. The mean for male 
defendants from honour culture were higher but male defendants  from non-honour cultures had 
the highest mean score. When viewing figure 4  the relationship between the variables looks like 
a classic interaction effect, however this cannot be tested because there did not appear to be a 
sensible non-parametric alternative to the two way ANOVA in this case.  
Given the effect that the distribution had on the capacity of the study to test this 
hypothesis it is important to consider why data isn’t normally distributed and should not be 
transformed to be this way.  Although the study does lack power which is a common cause of 
both lack of significance and non-normal distributions the fatal flaw is actually in the design of 
the PD measure. The PD measure is a Likert scale, as such it returns ordinal data which does not 
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map onto a normal distribution. Unlike  most psychological measures the PD does not sum 
across a number of different items as such scores on PD measure should not have natural 
variation like IQ or trait measures. However there is an underlying pattern of logic to ways in 
which people respond to the PD, the evidence for this can be seen in the across-group means of 
both gender and culture conditions. 
 
There will be a significant relationship between PD application and measures of culture 
attitudes  
The Mann-Whitney tests were not significant at the p = 0.0125 level after the Bonferroni 
correction. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis, that there is a significant relationship between 
measures of attitude toward culture and PD application is not supported by the data. The non-
significance of this result implies that the conjecture that the extent to which someone believes 
that race should not and does not matter is not related to their attributions of blame when 
observing an incident of IPV at least in the context of the PD. Similarly, the idea that a person’s 
beliefs about accepting cultural diversity are not related to their willingness to absolve the 
defendant or blame the victim in a case of IPV.  This finding is somewhat in line with De 
Pasquales (2002) argument that there is no ‘culture defence’ within the PD or at least that it does 
not serve to protect minority groups.  
There will be a significant relationship between PD application and measures of gender 
attitudes  
The Mann-Whitney tests for the ASI and AMI by PD application were not significant at 
the p=0.25 level therefor the null hypothesis of no effect cannot be rejected. The fifth hypothesis, 
that there will be a significant relationship between measures of attitude towards gender and 
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participants acceptance or rejection of the provocation defence is not supported. This undermines 
the propositions made in the introduction about the possibility of attitude to gender being linked 
to their willingness to attribute blame to the victim or excuse the defendant in an incident of 
intimate partner violence. It also does not align with Korbelis (2016) who found that there was a 
significant relationship between attitudes towards gender roles and PD application.  
 
 RRAMS and MCBS will have a strong positive relationship.  
In order to test the conceptual validity of the recently developed RRAMS measure 
participants scores on each subscale were compared with subscales which purport to measure the 
same thing on a similar scale the MCBS. There was a significant moderate positive correlation 
between Assimilationist subscale from the RRAMS and Colour-blind attitudes subscale from the 
MCBS. There was also a significant moderate positive correlation between the Pluralistic 
subscale of the RRAMS and the Multicultural attitudes subscale from MCBS. This suggest that 
the sixth hypothesis, there will be a strong positive relationship between the RRAMS and MCBS 
is partially supported because although there relationships were found to be significant and in the 
expected directions  they were not as strong as expected.  
Strengths, Weaknesses, and Conclusions  
The strengths of this study lie in its exploration of a novel area for mock juror research 
through its simultaneous examination of gender and culture manipulations. The testing of jurors 
comprehension of the PD  and then its application contributes to research around comprehension 
of jury instructions. It also contributes to Australian psychological literature on minorities other 
than indigenous persons which is quite underdeveloped considering the cultural and ethnic 
diversity of Australia as a nation. This study also contributes to the literature by testing the 
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construct validity of a newly developed scale of attitudes to culture which is aimed at an 
Australian population.   
The weaknesses of the study however are severe. Firstly, the study is low on power, this 
is attributable both to insufficient recruitment and to the high rate of participant attrition, possibly 
due to survey length. Power could be improved with more participants and also more specific 
hypotheses which would reduce the number of participants needed to achieve the conventional 
80% power. Secondly, the Likert scale PD measure means the data is not normally distributed 
and as such hypothesis three cannot be tested. This could be improved through formulating 
hypothesises which take into account the limitations of ordinal data. 
The implications of these weaknesses make drawing conclusions in this study difficult. 
The low power means the results of significance testing is inconclusive, possibly there is no 
effect of gender or culture on PD although this is counter to the logic from the literature around 
racial and gender effects on perception of behaviour and blame attribution. One pattern that 
seemed clear in the data was despite answers on measures elements of the PD which would 
support acceptance of the PD, participants overwhelmingly rejected it. Perhaps this reflects a 
reluctance to attribute blame to the victim or absolve perpetrators guilt in the official manner of a 
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Appendix 1 Scales and Flowchart 
PD Questionnaire 
If you were a juror on the case summary presented above, please answer the following 
questions about the extent to which you believe the elements of the Provocation Defense have 
been satisfied. 
Was there Provocative conduct?  
To determine whether there is provoking conduct is an objective test. Look at words or 
conduct by the victim that occurred at one single event, or over time, and would be provoking to 
an ordinary person. It need not be conduct which would cause someone to murder someone, but 
conduct that would generally give rise to a reaction or emotion. To what extent do you believe 
there was provoking conduct? 
1 Strongly Agree   7 Strongly Disagree 
How serious was the provocative conduct? 
The level of provocation is a subjective test and must be assessed by reference to relevant 
characteristics of the accused, eg gender, ethnicity. This means that conduct which might not be 
insulting or hurtful to one person might be extremely so to another because of that 
person’s gender, ethnicity, or circumstances. Keep in mind that the provocation may be words 
alone, e.g., “I hate you,” which in themselves do not seem provocative, but might be provocative 





Taking into account all these considerations, from the viewpoint of the accused, to what 
extent do you believe the accused would have felt provoked by all the victim's words/actions 
1 A Great Deal  7 Not At All 
  
Did the Accused lose self-control? 
Loss of self-control is not literal because if a personal literally lose self-control, their 
actions would not be voluntary, and therefore, they would have no criminal liability imposed. It 
refers to a stage between 'icy detachment and going berserk.' This is a subjective test, so think 
about it from the perspective of the accused. To what extent do you think the accused 'lost self-
control'? 
1 Strongly Agree 7 Strongly Disagree 
  
Could the provocation cause a reasonable person to lose self-control? 
Assuming that what occurred in the final meeting was the “last straw,” Ask yourself, to 
what extent do you believe whether the provocation of your chosen level of seriousness could 
cause an ordinary person to lose self-control and act in a manner which would encompass the 
accused’s actions? 
1 Strongly Agree 7 Strongly Disagree 
Would you, as a juror in this case, accept the provocation defense and thereby reduce the 
verdict from murder to manslaughter? 
Yes/No 












Race-Related Attitudes and Multiculturalism Scale  
 
 Multiculturalism Collour-Blind Scale  
Participants asked to indicate the degree (1 to 7) to which they think the items would 









Appendix 2 Trial Transcripts 
Female Asian (SITA KUMAR) 
Judges Summary of Evidence 
1    Sita Kumar you are accused of the murder of your husband Ramesh Kumar at Balwyn 
on 21 July .   
2    You and the deceased married in 1980 when he was only 19 and you were only 20 
years of age. Following some initial difficulties in the marriage including a separation of some 
months, you and your husband had two children – a son born and a daughter. You studied part 
time and worked your way through a series of accounting jobs to become the joint proprietor of a 
successful business involved in the re-enamelling of bathtubs. Your husband also after some 
years studied part time and obtained employment for four days a week as a bookkeeper with a 
clothing company. 
3    It is apparent that in the two years prior to her death your husband was increasingly 
unhappy in the marriage. In particular he found your behaviour controlling and oppressive, and it 
seems likely that his dissatisfaction also related back in part to some incidents earlier in the 
marriage. 
4    In any event, in May he left the family home while you were on a business trip to 
Japan and Korea. On your return you found that he and your daughter had moved into a flat in 
Toorak and that your son Matthew, who was then undertaking his final school year, was still 
living at the family home. 
5    I accept that the breakdown of your marriage in this way was from your point of view 
sudden, unexpected and emotionally destabilising in a way which you did not easily accept.   
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6    It is clear from the evidence of your family and friends that your reaction was to try 
desperately to re-establish the marriage. You immediately sought to make and maintain contact 
with your husband and met with him at least weekly for meals. You sought advice as to what you 
should do from trusted family friends and from friends of your husband in particular. You saw a 
series of counsellors for advice and set up joint appointments for both your husband and yourself 
to try and provide a framework for reconciliation.  
7    While undertaking these steps it is also clear that you suffered continuing and 
substantial anxiety. You ruminated obsessively about getting your husband back and had long 
and difficult discussions with your children (particularly your son) and other friends as to what 
was happening and as to what you should do.  
8    In the interim your husband had gained confidence and newfound happiness after the 
separation and had met another woman to whom he felt a strong initial attraction and with whom 
he rapidly formed a close relationship. 
9    In summary the period of weeks leading up to your husband's death was one in which 
you anxiously hoped and desperately endeavoured to re-establish your marriage while 
conversely your husband was seeking to "let you down gently" as he described it to those close 
to him. 
10    On Tuesday 15 June, your husband attended two counsellors in sequence with you. 
At the first counselling session he made it clear that from her point of view the marriage was 
virtually over. But at the second, after a detailed discussion of the marriage and its problems, the 
possibility that you would get back together was left open. Your husband said he was not going 
anywhere and three further appointments were made for joint counselling.  Following this you 
had dinner together. The following day you confirmed with the counsellor that there was a 
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possibility that the relationship might be saved.  You continued to try and make changes in your 
life which might help achieve this end. You sought to complete renovations to the family home 
and you attended a meditation therapist and after an initial session booked in for an extended 
sequence of meditation therapy sessions.  
11    At the same time your husband's relationship with his new female friend progressed 
to the point where, on the Friday, he characterised the relationship as serious and spoke with her 
of future plans together in some detail.   
12    On the Saturday your husband went to Geelong with you to watch your son play 
football.  During the course of the day it is apparent that he told you he was seeing someone else.  
A mutual friend who observed you at the football that day says it was obvious that there was 
tension between you.  On that evening and the following day you expressed doubts to others as 
to the future of the relationship and you inquired of your friends and children as to what they 
knew of your husband's new friendship.  Understandably those close to you were reluctant to 
confront you with all they had been told by your husband of his situation. They quite properly 
took the view that this was something you would have to work out with each other. Nevertheless, 
with hindsight it can be seen that you received mixed messages about the situation. Thus your 
husband's twin sister assured you that there was nothing in the relationship with the new woman 
and that your husband was just spreading his wings.   
13    On the Sunday night your son, again entirely understandably, asked your husband to 
tell you the true situation if in fact there was no prospect that he would return to you. 
14    You had requested your husband to come back to the family home and view 
renovations to the kitchen and family room areas which were almost completed.  You had put 
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considerable effort into completing these renovations in a way which you believed would please 
your husband and which you hoped would attract him to return home. 
15    On Monday 21 June, your husband went out to visit you at about midday at the 
family home in Balwyn.  On that morning he had told workmates how happy he was in the new 
relationship he had formed and that he wanted to bring things out into the open.  There is 
circumstantial evidence to suggest that he did not intend the meeting with you to be long.   
16    There is no direct evidence of what then occurred save for the account given by you 
in your record of interview.  I am prepared to accept that this account sets out the essential 
sequence of events.  It is circumstantial and detailed and describes a spiralling confrontation in a 
manner which would not easily be invented.   
17    It appears that firstly, there was a discussion concerning the renovations.  Your 
husband dismissed these as being of no significance.   
18    Next, you pleaded with him to return.  He said "You don't get it do you?  I'm over 
you.  I should have left you 10 years ago." 
19    Next, there was reference to your daughter, in the course of which your husband 
suggested that he would not allow her to visit you anymore. 
20    In turn, you told your husband that your son was upset with the situation and that the 
two of you needed to handle the situation properly. 
21    Next, there was a discussion about your husband's new female friend and you said to 
him that your daughter was "afraid of this girl."   
22    This produced an emphatic reaction from your husband that it was none of your 
business and that he was not with you anymore.  Next, you asked how serious the relationship 
was.  Your husband told you that he had had sleepovers and how much nicer than you the new 
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woman was, that they shared interests and he cared for her.  He then said that sex with you 
repulsed heim and screwed up his face and either said or implied how much better his new friend 
was. You assert that at this point he pushed you hard enough that you fell back against the 
kitchen wall. 
23    At this point you state in your record of interview that you lost control and attacked 
him. It is apparent from that record of interview and from the forensic medical evidence that you 
struck at least two heavy blows to his face, and that he then fell to the ground striking his head 
severely on the kitchen counter on the way down (the alternative to this last event being that you 
struck him a third severe blow to the side of the head).  Then having knocked him down and in 
circumstances where he was already affected by the initial blows, you proceeded to deliberately 
strangle him with your bare hands until he appeared lifeless. These blows to the head rendered 
him unconscious and subsequently caused his death.  
24    Following this you embarked immediately on a detailed and careful series of actions 
by way of cover up to which I shall shortly return.  It is highly improbable but not absolutely 
certain that your husband was dead when you believed him to be.  The assertion of the forensic 
medical examiner is that he died of positional asphyxiation suffered in the state of 
unconsciousness you had caused and did nothing to redress. 
25    After the fatal assault you made no attempt to revive your husband or to obtain 
emergency assistance for him.  Rather, you embarked immediately on a sequence of careful and 
calculated actions to try and cover up what you had done - cleaning the scene of the crime with 
detergent, removing the deceased's body and his belongings and placing them in your car, 
moving the deceased's car from your home to a nearby car park, taking with you a change of 
clothes and shoes, and a spade and driving to the Yan Yean area.  In the course of this journey 
59 
 
you made phone calls designed to simulate a lack of knowledge of your husband's whereabouts.  
On arriving at a relatively remote location you dragged your husband's body over the ground, 
buried it roughly in a crude shallow grave and concealed that grave with bush litter.  You buried a 
number of other incriminating items in a separate hole nearby and likewise concealed this hole.  
You drove back to Melbourne washing your car on the return journey and arranged to attend and 
then attended premises in Reservoir where you completed the process of ordering granite tops for 
benches for your kitchen in a collected and calm fashion.  On returning home you washed both 
your clothes and yourself and maintained an appearance of normality taking your son to dinner 
and answering a telephone inquiry from your daughter as to your husband's whereabouts on the 
basis that you did not know where he was.  Subsequently that evening you contacted a friend and 
then handed yourself in to the police. 
26    Turning then to the evidence as to provocation, I accept that it is likely that you were 
provoked to rage and anger by the confrontation with your husband.  It is apparent from the 
evidence of a whole series of witnesses who had contact with you (including a number of 
persons with relevant professional expertise) that you were extremely anxious, obsessed and 
emotionally fraught at the disintegration of your marriage. 
27    This evidence included evidence from impressively impartial witnesses such as Dr 
Rob Moodie and Dr Catherine Clarke, with whom you had had a series of contacts over the 
preceding days and who last saw and spoke to you on the day prior to the killing.  The jury also 
heard evidence from a series of very experienced psychologists and counsellors who saw you in 
the period immediately prior to the killing.  As I have said the weight of this evidence supports 
the view that you were at the time of the fatal confrontation in a state of extreme obsessive 
anxiety and desperately seeking to reassert control over the relationship with your husband.   
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28    Conversely, it is apparent, as I have said, that your husband enjoyed a growth in 
personal confidence and happiness after his separation from you.  He was excited by the new 
possibilities life appeared to hold for him. In addition he was pleased by the apparently 
reasonable way you reacted to the separation and I am satisfied he was not in any immediate fear 
of violence from you or he would not have travelled alone with you to Geelong on the Saturday, 
two days prior to his death, and advised you of his new relationship;  nor come out to visit you 
alone on the day of his death. 
29    In these circumstances, I accept that it is likely that at the time of the final 
confrontation with you, and at the climax of an argument in which both parties said a series of 
hurtful things to each other that you were unambiguously told what you feared most was true, 
namely that the marriage was over and that your husband had found a new lover. 
30    I turn now to the Jury, it is now your duty to weigh  the evidence put to you by the 
crown and the defense, which I have summarised here, and to reach a decision as to whether the 
accused is: a) not guilty of murder, b) guilty of murder or c) not guilty of murder but guilty of 
manslaughter by provocation. 
31    The issue which the Crown must establish in order to prove that Sita Kumar is guilty 
of murder is that the accused was not acting under provocation when she killed Ramesh Kumar. 
It is not for the defense to prove that the accused  was acting under provocation but for the 
Crown to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they were not. 
32    If the Crown satisfies you beyond reasonable doubt that all the other elements of 
murder have been established beyond reasonable doubt and Sita Kumar was not provoked to do 
what she did, the appropriate verdict is “guilty of murder”. If, however, the Crown does not 
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satisfy you that she was not provoked, the accused will be “not guilty of murder” but “guilty” of 
the less serious offence of manslaughter (that is, manslaughter by provocation). 
Male Asian (RAMESH KUMAR) 
Judges Summary of Evidence 
1. Ramesh Kumar you are accused of the murder of your wife Sita Kumar at Balwyn on 21 
July .   
2. You and the deceased married in 1980 when she was only 19 and you were only 20 years 
of age. Following some initial difficulties in the marriage including a separation of some 
months, you and your wife had two children – a son born and a daughter.  You studied 
part time and worked your way through a series of accounting jobs to become the joint 
proprietor of a successful business involved in the re-enamelling of bathtubs. Your wife 
also after some years studied part time and obtained employment for four days a week as 
a bookkeeper with a clothing company. 
3. It is apparent that in the two years prior to her death your wife was increasingly unhappy 
in the marriage.  In particular she found your behaviour controlling and oppressive, and it 
seems likely that her dissatisfaction also related back in part to some incidents earlier in 
the marriage. 
4. In any event, in May she left the family home while you were on a business trip to Japan 
and Korea. On your return you found that she and your daughter had moved into a flat in 
Toorak and that your son Matthew, who was then undertaking his final school year, was 
still living at the family home. 
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5. I accept that the breakdown of your marriage in this way was from your point of view 
sudden, unexpected and emotionally destabilising in a way which you did not easily 
accept.   
6. It is clear from the evidence of your family and friends that your reaction was to try 
desperately to re-establish the marriage. You immediately sought to make and maintain 
contact with your wife and met with her at least weekly for meals. You sought advice as 
to what you should do from trusted family friends and from friends of your wife in 
particular. You saw a series of counsellors for advice and set up joint appointments for 
both your wife and yourself to try and provide a framework for reconciliation.  
7. While undertaking these steps it is also clear that you suffered continuing and substantial 
anxiety. You ruminated obsessively about getting your wife back and had long and 
difficult discussions with your children (particularly your son) and other friends as to 
what was happening and as to what you should do.  
8. In the interim your wife had gained confidence and newfound happiness after the 
separation and had met another man to whom she felt a strong initial attraction and with 
whom she rapidly formed a close relationship. 
9. In summary the period of weeks leading up to your wife's death was one in which you 
anxiously hoped and desperately endeavoured to re-establish your marriage while 
conversely your wife was seeking to "let you down gently" as she described it to those 
close to her. 
10. On Tuesday 15 June, your wife attended two counsellors in sequence with you. At the 
first counselling session she made it clear that from her point of view the marriage was 
virtually over. But at the second, after a detailed discussion of the marriage and its 
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problems, the possibility that you would get back together was left open. Your wife said 
she was not going anywhere and three further appointments were made for joint 
counselling.  Following this you had dinner together. The following day you confirmed 
with the counsellor that there was a possibility that the relationship might be saved.  You 
continued to try and make changes in your life which might help achieve this end. You 
sought to complete renovations to the family home and you attended a meditation 
therapist and after an initial session booked in for an extended sequence of meditation 
therapy sessions.  
11. At the same time your wife's relationship with her new male friend progressed to the 
point where, on the Friday, he characterised the relationship as serious and spoke with her 
of future plans together in some detail.   
12. On the Saturday your wife went to Geelong with you to watch your son play football.  
During the course of the day it is apparent that she told you she was seeing someone else.  
A mutual friend who observed you at the football that day says it was obvious that there 
was tension between you.  On that evening and the following day you expressed doubts 
to others as to the future of the relationship and you inquired of your friends and children 
as to what they knew of your wife's new friendship.  Understandably those close to you 
were reluctant to confront you with all they had been told by your wife of her situation. 
They quite properly took the view that this was something you would have to work out 
with each other. Nevertheless, with hindsight it can be seen that you received mixed 
messages about the situation. Thus your wife's twin sister assured you that there was 
nothing in the relationship with the new man and that your wife was just spreading her 
wings.   
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13. On the Sunday night your son, again entirely understandably, asked your wife to tell you 
the true situation if in fact there was no prospect that she would return to you. 
14. You had requested your wife to come back to the family home and view renovations to 
the kitchen and family room areas which were almost completed.  You had put 
considerable effort into completing these renovations in a way which you believed would 
please your wife and which you hoped would attract her to return home. 
15. On Monday 21 June, your wife went out to visit you at about midday at the family home 
in Balwyn.  On that morning she had told workmates how happy she was in the new 
relationship she had formed and that she wanted to bring things out into the open.  There 
is circumstantial evidence to suggest that she did not intend the meeting with you to be 
long.   
16. There is no direct evidence of what then occurred save for the account given by you in 
your record of interview.  I am prepared to accept that this account sets out the essential 
sequence of events.  It is circumstantial and detailed and describes a spiralling 
confrontation in a manner which would not easily be invented.   
17. It appears that firstly, there was a discussion concerning the renovations.  Your wife 
dismissed these as being of no significance.   
18. Next, you pleaded with her to return.  She said "You don't get it do you?  I'm over you.  I 
should have left you 10 years ago. 
19. Next, there was reference to your daughter, in the course of which your wife suggested 
that she would not allow her to visit you anymore. 
20. In turn, you told your wife that your son was upset with the situation and that the two of 
you needed to handle the situation properly. 
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21. Next, there was a discussion about your wife's new male friend and you said to her that 
your daughter was "afraid of this guy."   
22. This produced an emphatic reaction from your wife that it was none of your business and 
that she was not with you anymore.  Next, you asked how serious the relationship was.  
Your wife told you that she had had sleepovers and how much nicer than you the new 
man was, that they shared interests and he cared for her.  She then said that sex with you 
repulsed her and screwed up her face and either said or implied how much better her new 
friend was. You assert that at this point she pushed you hard enough that you fell back 
against the kitchen wall. 
23. At this point you state in your record of interview that you lost control and attacked her. It 
is apparent from that record of interview and from the forensic medical evidence that you 
struck at least two heavy blows to her face, and that she then fell to the ground striking 
her head severely on the kitchen counter on the way down (the alternative to this last 
event being that you struck her a third severe blow to the side of the head).  Then having 
knocked her down and in circumstances where she was already affected by the initial 
blows, you proceeded to deliberately strangle her with your bare hands until she appeared 
lifeless.  
24. Following this you embarked immediately on a detailed and careful series of actions by 
way of cover up to which I shall shortly return.  It is highly improbable but not absolutely 
certain that your wife was dead when you believed her to be.  The assertion of the 
forensic medical examiner is that she died of positional asphyxiation suffered in the state 
of unconsciousness you had caused and did nothing to redress. 
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25. After the fatal assault you made no attempt to revive your wife or to obtain emergency 
assistance for her.  Rather, you embarked immediately on a sequence of careful and 
calculated actions to try and cover up what you had done - cleaning the scene of the 
crime with detergent, removing the deceased's body and her belongings and placing them 
in your car, moving the deceased's car from your home to a nearby car park, taking with 
you a change of clothes and shoes, and a spade and driving to the Yan Yean area.  In the 
course of this journey you made phone calls designed to simulate a lack of knowledge of 
your wife's whereabouts.  On arriving at a relatively remote location you dragged your 
wife's body over the ground, buried it roughly in a crude shallow grave and concealed 
that grave with bush litter.  You buried a number of other incriminating items in a 
separate hole nearby and likewise concealed this hole.  You drove back to Melbourne 
washing your car on the return journey and arranged to attend and then attended premises 
in Reservoir where you completed the process of ordering granite tops for benches for 
your kitchen in a collected and calm fashion.  On returning home you washed both your 
clothes and yourself and maintained an appearance of normality taking your son to dinner 
and answering a telephone inquiry from your daughter as to your wife's whereabouts on 
the basis that you did not know where she was.  Subsequently that evening you contacted 
a friend and then handed yourself in to the police. 
26. Turning then to the evidence as to provocation, I accept that it is likely that you were 
provoked to rage and anger by the confrontation with your wife.  It is apparent from the 
evidence of a whole series of witnesses who had contact with you (including a number of 
persons with relevant professional expertise) that you were extremely anxious, obsessed 
and emotionally fraught at the disintegration of your marriage. 
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27. This evidence included evidence from impressively impartial witnesses such as Dr Rob 
Moodie and Dr Catherine Clarke, with whom you had had a series of contacts over the 
preceding days and who last saw and spoke to you on the day prior to the killing.  The 
jury also heard evidence from a series of very experienced psychologists and counsellors 
who saw you in the period immediately prior to the killing.  As I have said the weight of 
this evidence supports the view that you were at the time of the fatal confrontation in a 
state of extreme obsessive anxiety and desperately seeking to reassert control over the 
relationship with your wife.   
28. Conversely, it is apparent, as I have said, that your wife enjoyed a growth in personal 
confidence and happiness after her separation from you.  She was excited by the new 
possibilities life appeared to hold for her. In addition she was pleased by the apparently 
reasonable way you reacted to the separation and I am satisfied she was not in any 
immediate fear of violence from you or she would not have travelled alone with you to 
Geelong on the Saturday, two days prior to her death, and advised you of her new 
relationship;  nor come out to visit you alone on the day of her death. 
29. In these circumstances, I accept that it is likely that at the time of the final confrontation 
with you, and at the climax of an argument in which both parties said a series of hurtful 
things to each other that you were unambiguously told what you feared most was true, 
namely that the marriage was over and that your wife had found a new lover. 
30. I turn now to the Jury, it is now your duty to weigh  the evidence put to you by the crown 
and the defense, which I have summarised here, and to reach a decision as to whether the 
accused is: a) not guilty of murder, b) guilty of murder or c) not guilty of murder but 
guilty of manslaughter by provocation. 
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31. The issue which the Crown must establish in order to prove that Ramesh Kumar is guilty 
of murder is that the accused was not acting under provocation when he killed Sita 
Kumar. It is not for the defense to prove that the accused  was acting under provocation 
but for the Crown to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they were not. 
32. If the Crown satisfies you beyond reasonable doubt that all the other elements of murder 
have been established beyond reasonable doubt and Ramesh Kumar was not provoked to 
do what he did, the appropriate verdict is “guilty of murder”. If, however, the Crown does 
not satisfy you that he was not provoked, the accused will be “not guilty of murder” but 
“guilty” of the less serious offence of manslaughter (that is, manslaughter by 
provocation). 
Female Caucasian (AMELIA SMITH) 
Judges Summary of Evidence 
1 Amelia Smith you are accused of the murder of your husband Oliver Smith at Balwyn on 
21 July .   
2    You and the deceased married in 1980 when he was only 19 and you were only 20 years of 
age. Following some initial difficulties in the marriage including a separation of some months, 
you and your husband had two children – a son born and a daughter.  You studied part time and 
worked your way through a series of accounting jobs to become the joint proprietor of a 
successful business involved in the re-enamelling of bathtubs. Your husband also after some 




3    It is apparent that in the two years prior to her death your husband was increasingly unhappy 
in the marriage.  In particular he found your behaviour controlling and oppressive, and it seems 
likely that his dissatisfaction also related back in part to some incidents earlier in the marriage. 
4    In any event, in May he left the family home while you were on a business trip to Japan and 
Korea. On your return you found that he and your daughter had moved into a flat in Toorak and 
that your son Matthew, who was then undertaking his final school year, was still living at the 
family home. 
5    I accept that the breakdown of your marriage in this way was from your point of view 
sudden, unexpected and emotionally destabilising in a way which you did not easily accept.   
6    It is clear from the evidence of your family and friends that your reaction was to try 
desperately to re-establish the marriage. You immediately sought to make and maintain contact 
with your husband and met with him at least weekly for meals. You sought advice as to what you 
should do from trusted family friends and from friends of your husband in particular. You saw a 
series of counsellors for advice and set up joint appointments for both your husband and yourself 
to try and provide a framework for reconciliation.  
7    While undertaking these steps it is also clear that you suffered continuing and substantial 
anxiety. You ruminated obsessively about getting your husband back and had long and difficult 
discussions with your children (particularly your son) and other friends as to what was happening 
and as to what you should do.  
8    In the interim your husband had gained confidence and newfound happiness after the 
separation and had met another woman to whom he felt a strong initial attraction and with whom 
he rapidly formed a close relationship. 
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9    In summary the period of weeks leading up to your husband's death was one in which you 
anxiously hoped and desperately endeavoured to re-establish your marriage while conversely 
your husband was seeking to "let you down gently" as he described it to those close to him. 
10    On Tuesday 15 June, your husband attended two counsellors in sequence with you. At the 
first counselling session he made it clear that from her point of view the marriage was virtually 
over. But at the second, after a detailed discussion of the marriage and its problems, the 
possibility that you would get back together was left open. Your husband said he was not going 
anywhere and three further appointments were made for joint counselling.  Following this you 
had dinner together. The following day you confirmed with the counsellor that there was a 
possibility that the relationship might be saved.  You continued to try and make changes in your 
life which might help achieve this end. You sought to complete renovations to the family home 
and you attended a meditation therapist and after an initial session booked in for an extended 
sequence of meditation therapy sessions.  
11    At the same time your husband's relationship with his new female friend progressed to the 
point where, on the Friday, he characterised the relationship as serious and spoke with her of 
future plans together in some detail.   
12    On the Saturday your husband went to Geelong with you to watch your son play football.  
During the course of the day it is apparent that he told you he was seeing someone else.  A 
mutual friend who observed you at the football that day says it was obvious that there was 
tension between you.  On that evening and the following day you expressed doubts to others as 
to the future of the relationship and you inquired of your friends and children as to what they 
knew of your husband's new friendship.  Understandably those close to you were reluctant to 
confront you with all they had been told by your husband of his situation. They quite properly 
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took the view that this was something you would have to work out with each other. Nevertheless, 
with hindsight it can be seen that you received mixed messages about the situation. Thus your 
husband's twin sister assured you that there was nothing in the relationship with the new woman 
and that your husband was just spreading his wings.   
13    On the Sunday night your son, again entirely understandably, asked your husband to tell you 
the true situation if in fact there was no prospect that he would return to you. 
14    You had requested your husband to come back to the family home and view renovations to 
the kitchen and family room areas which were almost completed.  You had put considerable 
effort into completing these renovations in a way which you believed would please your husband 
and which you hoped would attract him to return home. 
15    On Monday 21 June, your husband went out to visit you at about midday at the family home 
in Balwyn.  On that morning he had told workmates how happy he was in the new relationship 
he had formed and that he wanted to bring things out into the open.  There is circumstantial 
evidence to suggest that he did not intend the meeting with you to be long.   
16    There is no direct evidence of what then occurred save for the account given by you in your 
record of interview.  I am prepared to accept that this account sets out the essential sequence of 
events.  It is circumstantial and detailed and describes a spiralling confrontation in a manner 
which would not easily be invented.   
17    It appears that firstly, there was a discussion concerning the renovations.  Your husband 
dismissed these as being of no significance.   
18    Next, you pleaded with him to return.  He said "You don't get it do you?  I'm over you.  I 
should have left you 10 years ago." 
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19    Next, there was reference to your daughter, in the course of which your husband suggested 
that he would not allow her to visit you anymore. 
20    In turn, you told your husband that your son was upset with the situation and that the two of 
you needed to handle the situation properly. 
21    Next, there was a discussion about your husband's new female friend and you said to him 
that your daughter was "afraid of this girl."   
22    This produced an emphatic reaction from your husband that it was none of your business 
and that he was not with you anymore.  Next, you asked how serious the relationship was.  Your 
husband told you that he had had sleepovers and how much nicer than you the new woman was, 
that they shared interests and he cared for her.  He then said that sex with you repulsed heim and 
screwed up his face and either said or implied how much better his new friend was. You assert 
that at this point he pushed you hard enough that you fell back against the kitchen wall. 
23    At this point you state in your record of interview that you lost control and attacked him. It 
is apparent from that record of interview and from the forensic medical evidence that you struck 
at least two heavy blows to his face, and that he then fell to the ground striking his head severely 
on the kitchen counter on the way down (the alternative to this last event being that you struck 
him a third severe blow to the side of the head).  Then having knocked him down and in 
circumstances where he was already affected by the initial blows, you proceeded to deliberately 
strangle him with your bare hands until he appeared lifeless. These blows to the head rendered 
him unconscious and subsequently caused his death.  
24    Following this you embarked immediately on a detailed and careful series of actions by way 
of cover up to which I shall shortly return.  It is highly improbable but not absolutely certain that 
your husband was dead when you believed him to be.  The assertion of the forensic medical 
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examiner is that he died of positional asphyxiation suffered in the state of unconsciousness you 
had caused and did nothing to redress. 
25    After the fatal assault you made no attempt to revive your husband or to obtain emergency 
assistance for him.  Rather, you embarked immediately on a sequence of careful and calculated 
actions to try and cover up what you had done - cleaning the scene of the crime with detergent, 
removing the deceased's body and his belongings and placing them in your car, moving the 
deceased's car from your home to a nearby car park, taking with you a change of clothes and 
shoes, and a spade and driving to the Yan Yean area.  In the course of this journey you made 
phone calls designed to simulate a lack of knowledge of your husband's whereabouts.  On 
arriving at a relatively remote location you dragged your husband's body over the ground, buried 
it roughly in a crude shallow grave and concealed that grave with bush litter.  You buried a 
number of other incriminating items in a separate hole nearby and likewise concealed this hole.  
You drove back to Melbourne washing your car on the return journey and arranged to attend and 
then attended premises in Reservoir where you completed the process of ordering granite tops for 
benches for your kitchen in a collected and calm fashion.  On returning home you washed both 
your clothes and yourself and maintained an appearance of normality taking your son to dinner 
and answering a telephone inquiry from your daughter as to your husband's whereabouts on the 
basis that you did not know where he was.  Subsequently that evening you contacted a friend and 
then handed yourself in to the police. 
26    Turning then to the evidence as to provocation, I accept that it is likely that you were 
provoked to rage and anger by the confrontation with your husband.  It is apparent from the 
evidence of a whole series of witnesses who had contact with you (including a number of 
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persons with relevant professional expertise) that you were extremely anxious, obsessed and 
emotionally fraught at the disintegration of your marriage. 
27    This evidence included evidence from impressively impartial witnesses such as Dr Rob 
Moodie and Dr Catherine Clarke, with whom you had had a series of contacts over the preceding 
days and who last saw and spoke to you on the day prior to the killing.  The jury also heard 
evidence from a series of very experienced psychologists and counsellors who saw you in the 
period immediately prior to the killing.  As I have said the weight of this evidence supports the 
view that you were at the time of the fatal confrontation in a state of extreme obsessive anxiety 
and desperately seeking to reassert control over the relationship with your husband.   
28    Conversely, it is apparent, as I have said, that your husband enjoyed a growth in personal 
confidence and happiness after his separation from you.  He was excited by the new possibilities 
life appeared to hold for him. In addition he was pleased by the apparently reasonable way you 
reacted to the separation and I am satisfied he was not in any immediate fear of violence from 
you or he would not have travelled alone with you to Geelong on the Saturday, two days prior to 
his death, and advised you of his new relationship;  nor come out to visit you alone on the day of 
his death. 
29    In these circumstances, I accept that it is likely that at the time of the final confrontation 
with you, and at the climax of an argument in which both parties said a series of hurtful things to 
each other that you were unambiguously told what you feared most was true, namely that the 
marriage was over and that your husband had found a new lover. 
30    I turn now to the Jury, it is now your duty to weigh  the evidence put to you by the crown 
and the defense, which I have summarised here, and to reach a decision as to whether the 
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accused is: a) not guilty of murder, b) guilty of murder or c) not guilty of murder but guilty of 
manslaughter by provocation. 
31    The issue which the Crown must establish in order to prove that Amelia Smith is guilty of 
murder is that the accused was not acting under provocation when she killed Oliver Smith. It is 
not for the defense to prove that the accused  was acting under provocation but for the Crown to 
prove beyond reasonable doubt that they were not. 
32    If the Crown satisfies you beyond reasonable doubt that all the other elements of murder 
have been established beyond reasonable doubt and Amelia Smith was not provoked to do what 
she did, the appropriate verdict is “guilty of murder”. If, however, the Crown does not satisfy 
you that she was not provoked, the accused will be “not guilty of murder” but “guilty” of the less 
serious offence of manslaughter (that is, manslaughter by provocation). 
Male Caucasian (Oliver Smith) 
Judges Summary of Evidence 
1. Oliver Smith you are accused of the murder of your wife Amelia Smith at Balwyn on 21 
July .   
2. You and the deceased married in 1980 when she was only 19 and you were only 20 years 
of age. Following some initial difficulties in the marriage including a separation of some 
months, you and your wife had two children – a son born and a daughter.  You studied 
part time and worked your way through a series of accounting jobs to become the joint 
proprietor of a successful business involved in the re-enamelling of bathtubs.  Your wife 
also after some years studied part time and obtained employment for four days a week as 
a bookkeeper with a clothing company. 
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3. It is apparent that in the two years prior to her death your wife was increasingly unhappy 
in the marriage.  In particular she found your behaviour controlling and oppressive, and it 
seems likely that her dissatisfaction also related back in part to some incidents earlier in 
the marriage. 
4. In any event, in May she left the family home while you were on a business trip to Japan 
and Korea. On your return you found that she and your daughter had moved into a flat in 
Toorak and that your son Matthew, who was then undertaking his final school year, was 
still living at the family home. 
5. I accept that the breakdown of your marriage in this way was from your point of view 
sudden, unexpected and emotionally destabilising in a way which you did not easily 
accept.   
6. It is clear from the evidence of your family and friends that your reaction was to try 
desperately to re-establish the marriage. You immediately sought to make and maintain 
contact with your wife and met with her at least weekly for meals.  You sought advice as 
to what you should do from trusted family friends and from friends of your wife in 
particular.  You saw a series of counsellors for advice and set up joint appointments for 
both your wife and yourself to try and provide a framework for reconciliation.  
7. While undertaking these steps it is also clear that you suffered continuing and substantial 
anxiety.  You ruminated obsessively about getting your wife back and had long and 
difficult discussions with your children (particularly your son) and other friends as to 
what was happening and as to what you should do.   
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8. In the interim your wife had gained confidence and newfound happiness after the 
separation and had met another man to whom she felt a strong initial attraction and with 
whom she rapidly formed a close relationship. 
9. In summary the period of weeks leading up to your wife's death was one in which you 
anxiously hoped and desperately endeavoured to re-establish your marriage while 
conversely your wife was seeking to "let you down gently" as she described it to those 
close to her. 
10. On Tuesday 15 June, your wife attended two counsellors in sequence with you.  At the 
first counselling session she made it clear that from her point of view the marriage was 
virtually over.  But at the second, after a detailed discussion of the marriage and its 
problems, the possibility that you would get back together was left open.  Your wife said 
she was not going anywhere and three further appointments were made for joint 
counselling.  Following this you had dinner together.  The following day you confirmed 
with the counsellor that there was a possibility that the relationship might be saved.  You 
continued to try and make changes in your life which might help achieve this end.  You 
sought to complete renovations to the family home and you attended a meditation 
therapist and after an initial session booked in for an extended sequence of meditation 
therapy sessions.  
11. At the same time your wife's relationship with her new male friend progressed to the 
point where, on the Friday, he characterised the relationship as serious and spoke with her 
of future plans together in some detail.   
12. On the Saturday your wife went to Geelong with you to watch your son play football.  
During the course of the day it is apparent that she told you she was seeing someone else.  
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A mutual friend who observed you at the football that day says it was obvious that there 
was tension between you.  On that evening and the following day you expressed doubts 
to others as to the future of the relationship and you inquired of your friends and children 
as to what they knew of your wife's new friendship.  Understandably those close to you 
were reluctant to confront you with all they had been told by your wife of her situation.  
They quite properly took the view that this was something you would have to work out 
with each other.  Nevertheless, with hindsight it can be seen that you received mixed 
messages about the situation.  Thus your wife's twin sister assured you that there was 
nothing in the relationship with the new man and that your wife was just spreading her 
wings.   
13. On the Sunday night your son, again entirely understandably, asked your wife to tell you 
the true situation if in fact there was no prospect that she would return to you. 
14. You had requested your wife to come back to the family home and view renovations to 
the kitchen and family room areas which were almost completed.  You had put 
considerable effort into completing these renovations in a way which you believed would 
please your wife and which you hoped would attract her to return home. 
15. On Monday 21 June, your wife went out to visit you at about midday at the family home 
in Balwyn. On that morning she had told workmates how happy she was in the new 
relationship she had formed and that she wanted to bring things out into the open. There 
is circumstantial evidence to suggest that she did not intend the meeting with you to be 
long.   
16. There is no direct evidence of what then occurred save for the account given by you in 
your record of interview. I am prepared to accept that this account sets out the essential 
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sequence of events. It is circumstantial and detailed and describes a spiralling 
confrontation in a manner which would not easily be invented.  
17. It appears that firstly, there was a discussion concerning the renovations. Your wife 
dismissed these as being of no significance.  
18. Next, you pleaded with her to return.  She said "You don't get it do you?  I'm over you.  I 
should have left you 10 years ago." 
19. Next, there was reference to your daughter, in the course of which your wife suggested 
that she would not allow her to visit you anymore. 
20. In turn, you told your wife that your son was upset with the situation and that the two of 
you needed to handle the situation properly. 
21. Next, there was a discussion about your wife's new male friend and you said to her that 
your daughter was "afraid of this guy."   
22. This produced an emphatic reaction from your wife that it was none of your business and 
that she was not with you anymore. Next, you asked how serious the relationship was.  
Your wife told you that she had had sleepovers and how much nicer than you the new 
man was, that they shared interests and he cared for her. She then said that sex with you 
repulsed her and screwed up her face and either said or implied how much better her new 
friend was. You assert that at this point she pushed you hard enough that you fell back 
against the kitchen wall. 
23. At this point you state in your record of interview that you lost control and attacked her.  
It is apparent from that record of interview and from the forensic medical evidence that 
you struck at least two heavy blows to her face, and that she then fell to the ground 
striking her head severely on the kitchen counter on the way down (the alternative to this 
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last event being that you struck her a third severe blow to the side of the head).  Then 
having knocked her down and in circumstances where she was already affected by the 
initial blows, you proceeded to deliberately strangle her with your bare hands until she 
appeared lifeless.  
24. Following this you embarked immediately on a detailed and careful series of actions by 
way of cover up to which I shall shortly return. It is highly improbable but not absolutely 
certain that your wife was dead when you believed her to be.  The assertion of the 
forensic medical examiner is that she died of positional asphyxiation suffered in the state 
of unconsciousness you had caused and did nothing to redress. 
25. After the fatal assault you made no attempt to revive your wife or to obtain emergency 
assistance for her. Rather, you embarked immediately on a sequence of careful and 
calculated actions to try and cover up what you had done - cleaning the scene of the 
crime with detergent, removing the deceased's body and her belongings and placing them 
in your car, moving the deceased's car from your home to a nearby car park, taking with 
you a change of clothes and shoes, and a spade and driving to the Yan Yean area.  In the 
course of this journey you made phone calls designed to simulate a lack of knowledge of 
your wife's whereabouts.  On arriving at a relatively remote location you dragged your 
wife's body over the ground, buried it roughly in a crude shallow grave and concealed 
that grave with bush litter.  You buried a number of other incriminating items in a 
separate hole nearby and likewise concealed this hole.  You drove back to Melbourne 
washing your car on the return journey and arranged to attend and then attended premises 
in Reservoir where you completed the process of ordering granite tops for benches for 
your kitchen in a collected and calm fashion.  On returning home you washed both your 
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clothes and yourself and maintained an appearance of normality taking your son to dinner 
and answering a telephone inquiry from your daughter as to your wife's whereabouts on 
the basis that you did not know where she was.  Subsequently that evening you contacted 
a friend and then handed yourself in to the police. 
26. Turning then to the evidence as to provocation, I accept that it is likely that you were 
provoked to rage and anger by the confrontation with your wife.  It is apparent from the 
evidence of a whole series of witnesses who had contact with you (including a number of 
persons with relevant professional expertise) that you were extremely anxious, obsessed 
and emotionally fraught at the disintegration of your marriage. 
27. This evidence included evidence from impressively impartial witnesses such as Dr Rob 
Moodie and Dr Catherine Clarke, with whom you had had a series of contacts over the 
preceding days and who last saw and spoke to you on the day prior to the killing.  The 
jury also heard evidence from a series of very experienced psychologists and counsellors 
who saw you in the period immediately prior to the killing. As I have said the weight of 
this evidence supports the view that you were at the time of the fatal confrontation in a 
state of extreme obsessive anxiety and desperately seeking to reassert control over the 
relationship with your wife.   
28. Conversely, it is apparent, as I have said, that your wife enjoyed a growth in personal 
confidence and happiness after her separation from you. She was excited by the new 
possibilities life appeared to hold for her. In addition she was pleased by the apparently 
reasonable way you reacted to the separation and I am satisfied she was not in any 
immediate fear of violence from you or she would not have travelled alone with you to 
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Geelong on the Saturday, two days prior to her death, and advised you of her new 
relationship;  nor come out to visit you alone on the day of her death. 
29. In these circumstances, I accept that it is likely that at the time of the final confrontation 
with you, and at the climax of an argument in which both parties said a series of hurtful 
things to each other that you were unambiguously told what you feared most was true, 
namely that the marriage was over and that your wife had found a new lover. 
30. I turn now to the Jury, it is now your duty to weigh  the evidence put to you by the crown 
and the defense, which I have summarised here, and to reach a decision as to whether the 
accused is: a) not guilty of murder, b) guilty of murder or c) not guilty of murder but 
guilty of manslaughter by provocation. 
31. The issue which the Crown must establish in order to prove that Oliver Smith is guilty of 
murder is that the accused was not acting under provocation when he killed Amelia 
Smith. It is not for the defense to prove that the accused  was acting under provocation 
but for the Crown to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they were not. 
32. If the Crown satisfies you beyond reasonable doubt that all the other elements of murder 
have been established beyond reasonable doubt and Oliver Smith was not provoked to do 
what he did, the appropriate verdict is “guilty of murder”. If, however, the Crown does 
not satisfy you that he was not provoked, the accused will be “not guilty of murder” but 
“guilty” of the less serious offence of manslaughter (that is, manslaughter by 
provocation). 
 
 
